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Many studies claim to measure decision-making under risk by employing the Domain-
Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale, a self-report measure, or the Balloon Analogue
Risk Task (BART), a behavioural task. However, these tasks do not measure decision-
making under risk but decision-making under uncertainty, a related but distinct
concept. The present commentary discusses both the theoretical and empirical basis
of the distinction between uncertainty and risk from the viewpoint of several scientific
disciplines and reports how many studies wrongfully employ the DOSPERT scale and
BART as risk-taking measures. Importantly, we call for proper distinguishing between
(tasks measuring) decision-making under uncertainty and decision-making under risk
in psychology, and related fields. We believe this is vital as research has shown that
people’s attitudes, behaviour, and brain activity differ between both concepts, indicating
that confusing the concepts may lead researchers to erroneous conclusions.
Keywords: risk, uncertainty, DOSPERT scale, BART, decision-making
INTRODUCTION
Many studies claim to examine decision-making under risk, using a broad range of measures to
indicate an individual’s level of risk-taking. Well-known examples of these measures include the
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT, Blais and Weber, 2006) scale, a self-report measure, and
the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART, Lejuez et al., 2002), a behavioural measure. However,
despite including the word ‘risk’ in their names, the DOSPERT scale and BART in fact do not deal
with attitude towards risk. The concept they deal with is attitude towards uncertainty, a related but
distinct phenomenon that is often contaminated with risk attitude in psychological literature.
THE THEORY BEHIND DECISION-MAKING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY VERSUS RISK
In economics, the distinction between uncertainty and risk proposed by Knight (1921) has become
classic and has been hardly contested. In the case of risk, the outcome is unknown, but the
probability distribution governing that outcome is known. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is
characterised by both an unknown outcome and an unknown probability distribution. In both
cases, preferences are defined across chance distributions of outcomes. For risk, these chances are
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taken to be objective, whereas for uncertainty, they are subjective.
Consider betting with a friend by rolling a die. If one rolls
at least a four, one wins 30 Euros (or Pounds, Dollars, Yen,
Republic Dataries, Bitcoins, etc.). If one rolls lower, one loses.
If the die is unbiased, one’s decision to accept the bet is taken
with the knowledge that one has a 50 per cent chance of winning
and losing. This situation is characterised by risk. However, if
the die has an unknown bias, the situation is characterised by
uncertainty. The latter applies to all situations in which one
knows that there is a chance of winning and losing but has no
information on the exact distribution of these chances.
When laypersons talk about risk, they generally mean
uncertainty, as the outcome probabilities are seldom known
in everyday situations. In contrast to laypersons, scientists
cannot afford to confound the concepts of risk and uncertainty.
Contaminating these 2 concepts and hence not adhering to
the uncertainty/risk (U/R) distinction is problematic, as this
distinction has been supported by various studies showing that it
is not only conceptually but also empirically valid. These studies
primarily come from three scientific disciplines: economics,
psychology, and neurobiology.
FINDINGS FROM ECONOMICS
Behavioural economic literature has supported the validity of the
U/R distinction by showing that individuals are less sensitive
to likelihood information in the case of uncertainty compared
to risk: likelihood insensitivity decreases with more information
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahn and Sarin, 1988; Kilka and
Weber, 2001; Abdellaoui et al., 2005, 2011; Baillon et al., 2012,
2013, 2017). This phenomenon can be illustrated with the use
of a fictional lottery. In the lottery, the difference between a win
probability of 0 and 0.1 is substantial, for it reflects the difference
between no chance versus a chance. The difference between a
probability of 0.9 and 1 is also large, for the latter means a certain
win. By contrast, the difference between 0.3 and 0.4, or between
0.6 and 0.7 seems small. If one is not even sure whether these 0.3
and 0.4 (or 0.6, and 0.7) probabilities are accurate (uncertainty),
it is plausible that one will treat them as equivalent. Hence, the
less information individuals have (uncertainty vs. risk), the more
they fail to sufficiently discriminate between different levels of
likelihood (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Baillon et al., 2012;
Baillon, 2015). In addition, the behavioural economic literature
shows aversion towards uncertain compared to risky choices
(something referred to as ambiguity aversion): individuals prefer
known probabilities over unknown probabilities, even if the
known probability is low and the unknown probability could be
a guaranteed win (Ellsberg, 1961). In the original experiments,
this phenomenon is illustrated with urns. Imagine there are 2
urns: the ‘known’ urn, with 50 red and 50 black balls, and the
‘unknown’ urn, which contains 100 balls that are red or black in
an unknown proportion. Winning is achieved by drawing a red
ball. Which urn do people want to draw from? When asked this
question, most people opt for the known urn. However, if they
win when drawing a black ball, they also opt for the known urn.
This decision contradicts the notion of probability: people act as
if the chance of drawing a red ball from the unknown urn is less
than 50 per cent, but also as if the chance of drawing a black ball
from that same urn is less than 50 per cent. This so-called Ellsberg
paradox illustrates our initial statement: when asked to choose,
individuals prefer risk over uncertainty.
FINDINGS FROM PSYCHOLOGY
Next to behavioural economic literature, psychological literature
also supports the empirical distinction between uncertainty and
risk. Buckert et al. (2014), for example, show that the cortisol
response to stress impacts decision-making under risk, but not
under uncertainty. In addition, several studies show how risk
and uncertainty are differentially impaired in a broad range of
(neuro) psychological disorders. For example, decision-making
under uncertainty but not under risk has shown to be impaired
in patients who have undergone unilateral temporal lobe
surgery (Bonatti et al., 2009), patients with gambling problems
(Brevers et al., 2012), breast cancer patients receiving adjuvant
chemotherapy (Chen et al., 2013), patients with obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Starcke et al., 2009, 2010; Kim et al.,
2015; Zhang et al., 2015a,b), and patients with pathological
buying issues (Trotzke et al., 2015). The same dissociation
holds for normal ageing (Zamarian et al., 2008). The situation,
however, is reversed for patients with Parkinson’s disease, who
are differentially impaired in decision-making under risk, but
not in decision-making under uncertainty (Euteneuer et al.,
2009), which could be explained by the notion that decision-
making under risk depends more on executive functioning than
does decision-making under uncertainty (Brand et al., 2006).
These dissociations provide further support for the empirical
distinction between uncertainty and risk.
FINDINGS FROM NEUROBIOLOGY
Extending the psychological literature, several studies from
the field of neurobiology indicate that risk and uncertainty
are differentially coded in the brain. Currently, 2 hypotheses
exist outlining how dealing with uncertainty versus risk differs
neurobiologically (Schultz et al., 2008). First, both situations may
recruit different brain systems, resulting in double dissociations.
This hypothesis is supported by studies showing that risk recruits
the orbitofrontal cortex, striatum, insula, and (posterior) parietal
cortex, whereas uncertainty recruits the amygdala and parts of
the frontal cortex such as the inferior frontal gyrus, and the
(dorsal) lateral prefrontal cortex (Huettel et al., 2006; Krain et al.,
2006; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Schultz et al., 2008; Bach et al.,
2009). Second, risk and uncertainty may recruit a common brain
mechanism but to different degrees, showing stronger responses
to either ambiguous or risky choices. This idea is backed up by
studies showing that the activity in some brain structures, such
as the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala, is positively related to
the level of uncertainty in a task, whereas activity in the striatal
system is negatively correlated (Hsu et al., 2005; Platt and Huettel,
2008; Schultz et al., 2008; Levy et al., 2010). These findings
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support a graded rather than an all or nothing difference between
how uncertainty and risk are neurobiologically coded. There is
no conclusive evidence yet on whether uncertainty and risk are
mutually exclusive or graded represented in the brain. However,
regardless of which hypothesis is supported, uncertainty and risk
can be said to differ from each other even at a biological level,
which is an important signal of the essential difference between
uncertainty and risk.
THE DOSPERT SCALE AND BART
The discussed behavioural economic, psychological, and
neurobiological studies demonstrate how uncertainty and risk
differ not only on a theoretical basis, but also empirically.
This emphasises the need to properly distinguish between the
2 concepts in research. However, as discussed, 2 paradigms
that claim to measure decision-making under risk in fact deal
with uncertainty: the DOSPERT scale and the BART. For the
DOSPERT scale, items include ‘going camping in the wilderness,’
‘drinking heavily at a social function,’ and ‘investing 10 per cent
of your annual income in a new business venture’. For all these
items and the others, the outcome distribution is unclear. There
is a level of uncertainty, but since the probability distribution of
the described situations is not known, this cannot be qualified
as risk in the Knightian sense. The same is true for the BART.
In the BART, individuals pump up a balloon that can explode
at any time. Since the probability distribution of explosions is
unknown to the participant (‘participants were given no detailed
information about the probability of an explosion,’ Lejuez et al.,
2002, p. 77), there is again a level of uncertainty, which cannot be
qualified as risk. For the DOSPERT scale, the uncertainty is bi-
directional: both the researcher and the participant are ignorant
of the probability distribution. For the BART, the uncertainty is
one-directional: from the viewpoint of the researcher, the risk
is known, as he or she knows how the probability distribution
of the task has been programmed. The participant, on the other
hand, is not given any information about this.
Although the DOSPERT scale and BART are both clear
examples of uncertainty measures, studies applying them do
generally not acknowledge that the measures deal with decision-
making under uncertainty instead of risk. To examine how
pervasive this mistake is, a literature review was conducted
using Scopus across November, 2017. The first search parameter
concerned the full name of both tasks as mentioned in the article
title, abstract, or keywords as indexed in Scopus. This resulted in
17 articles on the DOSPERT scale, and 289 articles on the BART.
These 306 articles were all read and classified into 4 categories.
An article was categorised as recognising the uncertainty nature
of the DOSPERT scale or BART if the article explicitly mentioned
that the DOSPERT scale or BART measures decision-making
under uncertainty (instead of risk) because the probabilities
relevant for the task are unknown to the participant, or if the
article seemed to implicitly understand the difference between
decision-making under uncertainty and risk, for example by
discussing the conceptual difference between known versus
unknown probabilities in relation to the experimental paradigms.
However, articles were not included in this category if they only
stated that probabilities in the task were unknown (which is
simply a task characteristic), without relating this to uncertainty
or risk. Articles were also not included if they correctly stated
that the task measured uncertainty but mentioned invalid reasons
for this (for example because ‘the outcome is unknown,’ which
is a characteristic of both risk and uncertainty). Articles were
classified as not recognising the U/R distinction if they did not
seem to be aware of the distinction between the 2 concepts in
relation to the DOSPERT scale or BART. This was for example
reflected by consistently using the concepts intertwined without
discussing the difference; explicitly stating that uncertainty and
risk are equal; discussing uncertainty and risk but not relating this
to the DOSPERT scale or BART; or stating that the DOSPERT
scale or BART measures decision-making under risk, while not
mentioning uncertainty (or related concepts such as ambiguity,
or unknown probabilities) at all. The 2 remaining categories
concerned ‘not accessible’ (if the full text of an article could not be
accessed) and ‘not applicable’ (if the article did not say anything
concerning either uncertainty or risk, for instance because the
DOSPERT scale or BART was used for measuring a different
construct, such as impulsivity). The second search parameter
concerned the abbreviation of both measures, again as mentioned
in the article title, abstract, or keywords as indexed in Scopus.
This resulted in 45 articles on the DOSPERT scale, and 3137
on the BART. For these articles, the abstracts were examined,
and irrelevant articles (e.g., articles discussing Bart Syndrome)
were removed from the search findings. In addition, articles that
were already included based on the first search parameters were
also removed. The remaining articles were again all read and
classified according to the abovementioned criteria. The final
categorisation consisted of 48 articles on the DOSPERT scale,
and 302 articles on the BART. The included articles were solely
identified via the search parameters; no additional method of
including articles was employed.
The results from the categorisation can be found in Figure 1.
The findings were in line with our proposition that most studies
do not adhere to the U/R distinction and do not correctly
identify the DOSPERT scale and BART as uncertainty measures.
This was also true for several studies published in this journal.
Overall in the literature, only 7.1 per cent of articles correctly
adhered to the U/R distinction in relation to the DOSPERT
scale and BART. The Knightian distinction between uncertainty
and risk was not adhered to by 88.3 per cent of articles.
The classification of all examined articles was archived in an
online repository and can be accessed via a weblink that is
available from the authors upon request. In addition to the
basic classification, the repository holds information indicating
whether the authors thought a certain classificatory decision was
up for debate. This was the case for 12.3 per cent of articles.
For these articles, the arguments on which the final decision
was based are also reported. The most common arguments
reported are discussing the U/R distinction in relation to other
tasks but not to the DOSPERT scale or BART; correctly stating
that the DOSPERT scale or BART measures decision-making
under uncertainty but reporting invalid arguments for this claim;
and applying a Bayesian learning paradigm to the BART that
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FIGURE 1 | Summary of the categorization process and outcomes.
quantifies the decision maker’s changing uncertainty about the
chances of the balloon exploding, but that does not explicitly say
anything regarding the U/R distinction. All articles characterised
by these arguments were categorised as not adhering to the
U/R distinction, which resulted in a relatively conservative
classification. However, the percentage of articles not properly
adhering to the U/R distinction in relation to the DOSPERT scale
and BART remains high (namely 78.3 per cent) if all articles now
classified as ‘mistake’+ ‘up for debate’ were classified as properly
adhering to the distinction.
THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTINGUISHING
BETWEEN DECISION-MAKING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY VERSUS RISK
From the literature review, we conclude that not properly
adhering to the U/R distinction is a widespread problem. Most
articles do not even mention the distinction, let alone correctly
identify the DOSPERT scale and BART as measuring decision-
making under uncertainty instead of risk. However, the present
finding that 88.3 per cent of articles does not adhere to the
Knightian distinction between uncertainty and risk in relation
to the DOSPERT scale or BART does not necessarily mean
that 88.3 per cent of authors are unaware of the distinction. In
fact, we believe that most researchers understand the conceptual
distinction between uncertainty and risk, but do not explicitly
report on this in their articles. This absence of uncertainty/risk
information in articles could simply be the result of common
practises within the field. In psychology, terms such as ‘risk-
taking’ and ‘riskiness’ often signify not only a known chance
but also a directional effect: a high chance of loss. Uncertainty
does not allow for a similar directional connotation, which
may result in using the term less frequently. Furthermore, if
only few studies explicitly distinguish between uncertainty and
risk, this becomes the default within a field, leading others to
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also not report on this distinction even though they may have
considered it when designing their study. This is reflected in
the observation that articles that adhere to the U/R distinction
are not only scarce but are also not consistently referred
to in the literature. This contributes to the contamination
of both concepts that currently dominates the literature, and
makes research prone to confusion, especially when crossing
disciplinary lines.
Being aware of the distinction between uncertainty and risk
and applying this knowledge in scientific writings not only is of
great importance for scientific coherence but also has meaningful
practical implications for government and business because the
rules used for decision-making under risk differ from those
used for decision-making under uncertainty. As an example,
Angner (2012) discusses the regulation of new and unstudied
chemical substances. There is little hard data on them, but there
is some probability that they will turn out to be toxic. If a
policy maker would argue that the decision at hand concerns
uncertainty, he or she would have to decide that the new chemical
should be banned or heavily regulated until its safety can be
established. Speaking in behavioural economic terms, either the
minimax (minimising the maximum amount of deaths) or the
maximin (maximising the minimum amount of profit) criterion
applies in this situation. However, if the policy maker argues
that one can and must assign probabilities to all outcomes, he
or she faces a choice under risk, and will probably permit the
use of the new chemical because the probability that it will
turn out to be truly dangerous is low (the expected utility,
the alternative with the greatest amount of utility in the long
run, is highest for permitting the use). This example shows
that decision-making under uncertainty versus risk results in
different responses. Therefore, whether a decision is treated
as a choice under uncertainty or under risk can have real
consequences.
WHAT SHOULD RESEARCHERS DO?
The aim of the present commentary is not to scold researchers
from fields such as psychology for not using terminology and
conventions used in economics. We do, however, encourage
researchers to properly distinguish between uncertainty and
risk. We believe that the majority of researchers are in fact
already aware of this distinction, even though this is not
always reflected in their writings. Moreover, the aim of our
commentary is not to take credit for the idea that the
DOSPERT scale and BART do not measure attitude towards
risk but rather towards uncertainty. In fact, we mention several
previous studies that explicitly contribute to this view by
providing empirical support for the conceptual distinction.
Furthermore, studies adhering to the U/R distinction in relation
to the DOSPERT scale or BART can be found in the
repository.
The aim of the present commentary is to unite previous
research, and to make researchers explicitly aware of the
distinction between uncertainty and risk. In addition, the aim is
to advise researchers on what tasks (not) to use. For example,
a self-report measure probing pure risk-taking should include
clear indicators of the probability distribution underlying the
outcomes of the described activities. Furthermore, the BART
should not be used for measuring pure risk-taking. Instead,
different behavioural tasks such as the Cambridge Gambling
Task (CGT, Rogers et al., 1999), Game of Dice Task (GDT,
Brand et al., 2005), and Columbia Card Task (CCT, Figner
et al., 2009) should be used when aiming to measure decision-
making under risk. It should be noted though that in real life
the chances are almost always unknown, which means that
risk has more theoretical than practical importance. Therefore,
there is certainly merit to using the DOSPERT scale and BART,
especially considering their good external validity. In fact, we
could even speculate that this good external validity can be
explained by the fact that these tasks measure decision-making
under uncertainty (and not risk), which corresponds well to
the structure of decision-making in real life. Looking even
closer at how decision-making in real life is accomplished, it
appears that the distinction between uncertainty and risk is
continuous rather than binary. In many cases, individuals have
some estimate of the involved probabilities, which develops as
they move further along in the decision-making process and
receive feedback by sampling the environment. This development
is mirrored, for example, in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT,
Bechara et al., 1994), in which participants learn the probabilities
associated with card decks as they progress through the task.
It could even be argued that the BART is characterised by a
learning process as well, which is reflected by studies applying
learning models to the task. However, regardless of what (version
of a) task is used, it is important to be explicitly aware of
what it is measuring: decision-making under uncertainty (BART
and DOSPERT scale), decision-making under risk (CGT, GDT,
and CCT), or a gradual shift from decision-making under
uncertainty to decision-making under risk (IGT and possibly
BART). This way, the used nomenclature can stay pure and
help readers identify what concepts are examined in a particular
study.
Scientists are expected to outperform laypersons in properly
distinguishing between concepts. Considering the fluidity of
interdisciplinary research, it is pertinent to employ a sole
and clear-cut definition of concepts across fields. This is
particularly important if concepts have been shown to differ
both theoretically and empirically. The present commentary
calls for distinguishing uncertainty and risk in the field
of psychology and related fields where decision-making
under uncertainty and decision-making under risk play
an important role, such as neuroeconomics. This will help
in using tasks that actually measure the concept one is
interested in measuring, which will certainly aid in finding true
relationships.
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